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Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Consent  







The European Union is exploring a move toward harmonization in the form of a 
common commercial code (CESL), with some mandatory provisions especially with 
respect to consumer law, but alsoincorporating a large dose of business-to-business law 
that would be optional at the enterprise, rather than jurisdictional, level. This paper 
begins with the question of when harmonization is preferable to diversity, and not just 
with respect to commercial law. It tackles the problem from the perspective of the median 
voters in jurisdictions, some of which have similar preferences and some not. It 
introduces the ability of a stable and like-minded group to impose external costs on 
others, and then also on the ability of like-minded players to benefit by favoring central 






All harmonization is not equal. When it comes to child labor, for example, members of an 
economic or political union, and even their external critics and competitors, generally 
agree that constituent states should harmonize their laws. Mere trading partners agree to 
harmonize their copyright laws. There is less agreement about securities law, and much 
less about other subjects of domestic regulation, including school curricula, state-
supported religions, health care delivery, tort law, subsidy and taxation of the arts, and 
approval processes for pharmaceuticals. For these subjects, we find variety with respect 
to policies, statutory frameworks, rules, and enforcement even within “unified” legal 
systems. Across jurisdictions, only some of these laws seem to converge over time, 
though there is more harmonization within an economic union than among simple trading 
partners. One wonders whether the variety illuminates the optimal level of harmonization 
with respect to commercial law in the European Union. 
For the most part, harmonization opportunities come at the expense of variety, in the 
form of respecting local preferences, or political outcomes. There are many potential 
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gains from harmonization, but proponents of harmonization with respect to commercial 
law across the European Union are likely to stress the potential reduction in transaction 
costs. Skeptics are likely to be anxious about the process of choosing the focal points 
around which to harmonize and then also to favor the ongoing competition among 
jurisdictions that harmonization suppresses. One form of compromise is not to harmonize 
but to offer an attractive alternative that might appeal to jurisdictions, or even to 
businesses and individuals, that can then opt in to this alternative set of legal rules–
though it must be apparent that member states could simply harmonize around one of the 
many existing commercial codes. The alternative might be limited to, or more attractive 
for, cross-border transactions. The Draft Common European Sales Law (CESL) fits this 
description, even as it incorporates many mandatory terms. It offers an opportunity to 
think specifically and generally about harmonization. 
 
 
Part 2 begins quite generally with the relationship between local preferences and 
harmonization. Part 3 takes a brief detour to include the role of harmonization in 
promoting union-wide identity. Part 4 takes account of local preferences, and the role of 
the median voter, in order to understand what might be harmonized. Part 5 introduces the 
inefficient moves a majority might make because of its ability to impose “external costs.” 
These inefficiencies can illuminate the winners and losers from harmonization. Part 6 
builds to a conclusion about the winners and losers from harmonization by developing 
the notion of an organized subgroup with similar preferences, and contrasting 
harmonization with spontaneous convergence. 
 
2.  Preferences as a source of harmonization or variety 
 
There are two conventional explanations for the failure to respect local preferences where 
child labor is concerned. The first is that children have little market power, political 
influence, or representation. One might learn to tolerate or even celebrate diversity, but it 
is easier to do so where there is real choice. Citizens of Country A might find some of 
Country B’s laws exotic, but that tolerance is often limited to settings where B’s citizens 
could dethrone their ruler if they chose; child labor, torture, serious discrimination, and 
even capital punishment are quite different. A’s citizens might be outraged by B’s 
segregated housing patterns, income inequality, genetically modified crops, consumption 
of horse meat, immodest fashions, and so forth. With the possible exception of consumer 
protection, most of commercial law creates less excitement in foreign jurisdictions, so 
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that it is likely that this explanation of harmonization has little bearing on our subject, 
except to remind us that it can come from preferences about other people’s well-being. 
 A second explanation is that one’s own moral sensibilities with respect to the 
behavior of others are heightened when competitive advantage is in the air. If a 
jurisdiction prefers nicer parks, and raises taxes to finance these parks,1 it recognizes that 
some businesses may migrate to other jurisdictions, but at least that seems “fair.” The 
parks do not serve the needs of the businesses, and residents must pay for the parks they 
prefer. In contrast, if a jurisdiction shelters the homeless, its citizens are apt to think that 
it is wrong for businesses to be able to move away and escape “their share” of this cost. 
The superior shelters represent an unselfish expenditure, or so it will be thought, and, if 
mobility is easy, there may be a race to the bottom in which no one can afford to help the 
homeless even though some prefer to do at the first step. If we combine the two 
explanations we can say that the objection to local preferences, and the moral case for 
harmonization, arises either where human rights are concerned or where mobile taxpayers 
are perceived as evading a responsibility and driving jurisdictions to a lowest common 
denominator where other-regarding preferences are at issue. 
 The domestic regulation of child labor might raise the cost of doing business, and 
this will encourage some businesses to expand or migrate to unregulated jurisdictions. 
Domestic interests will regard this as a race to the bottom. A jurisdiction might combat 
some part of this unpleasant competition by regulating consumption rather than 
production. Its law might simply forbid the consumption of goods made with child labor–
or made in jurisdictions with pro-business commercial law–or it might tax such goods to 
compensate for the advantage that the “inferior” regulatory system bestows on its 
businesses. A mixed approach could bar domestic production and then ban offending 
imports. But this strategy suffers from high enforcement costs. The offended jurisdiction 
requires a good deal of information about production in other countries; in contrast, most 
domestic regulation succeeds by monitoring a very few manufacturing sites or accepting 
complaints from whistleblowers, of which there will be many when a popular cause is at 
issue. Moreover, even when foreign violations can be identified, one must have the 
ability to block or tax imports. It is not just that international trade agreements may stand 
in the way, but also that goods can be channeled through third countries or simply sold in 
																																																								
1 I recognize that a jurisdiction has no preferences, but rather that the people within it do so. The 
discussion refers to a jurisdiction’s sentiments as shorthand for its median voter, its politicians, its 
intensely concerned and organized constituents, or its constituents’ aggregated welfare, as the 
context requires.  
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other countries while nonoffending goods are directed to the jurisdiction with the highest 
standards. 
 This initial example will seem rather remote from most of commercial law, with 
regard to which the rhetoric is likely to be about transaction costs rather than morality.2 
Still, preference protection may be more important than transaction costs in terms of 
motivating harmonization.3 The example is also unusual, or even misleading, because 
most strategies for satisfying preferences lead to respect for disparate practices, or 
variety in law or markets, if only to satisfy dissimilar predilections across jurisdictions. 
Most preferences can be satisfied without insisting that other jurisdictions’ practices 
advance the same preferences as one’s own. 
 An easy example of this sort of variety concerns public support for the arts. A 
citizen might feel strongly that her government should support ballet companies, rather 
than have those entities rely entirely on patrons, but it is rare to see political capital 
expended in order to encourage a foreign jurisdiction to support that art form. Few people 
object to diversity in arts spending, though they do not go so far as to appreciate the 
economist’s Tieboutian perspective, that they might relocate and sort themselves into 
jurisdictions that offer the bundle of taxes and goods they prefer. Sorting at this level is 
																																																								
2 Harmonization in commercial law is unlikely to be justified on the basis of externalities, though 
it might be advanced with the claim that nonharmonized rules encourage some leakage and thus 
devalue a country’s unilateral laws. The claim seems weak for commercial law. Similarly, the 
usual fear of unfair competition from unregulated jurisdictions seems much more robust where 
preferences are concerned, as discussed in the text, than for commercial law. A claim regarding 
an economy of scale seems plausible but nothing stops a jurisdiction from allowing its 
commercial laws to converge with others. Harmonized laws might be a step towards political 
unification, which brings its own scale economies, but this seems minor in the case of the EU. 
These features of harmonization reflect the useful and insightful framework, as well as 
skepticism, advanced in Leebron, “Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework”, (1996) 
27 Canadian Business Law Journal (1996), 63-107.  
 A respectable case could be made for the idea that local preferences have so little to do 
with commercial law (consumer protection aside), that the game must be entirely about principal-
agent problems or other reasons why jurisdictions resist the “obvious” gains from harmonization. 
Carbonara & Parisi, “The Paradox of Legal Harmonization”, (2007) Public Choice 367. The 
authors adopt this starting point, and then proceed with the interesting idea that local resistance 
might be a strategy to get others to absorb the “switching costs.” In other words, harmonization 
offers benefits, and the trick is to incur as little of the costs as possible. To the extent that this is 
the case, the discussion here adds fuel to the wrong fire. 
3 Gomez & Ganuza, “An Economic Analysis of Harmonization Regimes: Full Harmonization, 
Minimum Harmonization or Optional Instrument”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0052/contributions/166_en.pdf, sets out clearly 
the choice between transaction costs saving and local (country level) preferences, along with 
references to the ongoing debate regarding EU commercial law. The discussion below reflects 
some of the same thinking about the likely compromises that are made when two or more 
jurisdictions harmonize their laws. 
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academic. Moving is costly and even prohibitive for many residents; governments are 
unable to promise the continued provision of particular goods;4 and there are too many 
goods alongside too few jurisdictions that will accept migrants. A modest amount of 
sorting is the best we can expect. 
 
3. Harmonization and a “preference” for shared identity 
 
Why then does a central government ever support something regarding which there are 
diverse preferences? First, there may be an interest group, or even a majority, that is well 
enough organized to defeat local interest groups. The interest group that wants to spread 
its desire for ballet may find it cheaper to push for central support than to influence ten 
local governments. Other interest groups can, of course, compete, and when the dust 
settles it will be impossible for us to judge whether interest-group activity helped reveal 
intense preferences and achieve a desirable result or, instead, encouraged wasteful rent-
seeking or imposed external costs (a topic discussed in Part 5 below) and did not 
maximize social welfare. Similarly, we might intuit that some interest groups prefer the 
harmonization of commercial law and others do not, but we are enfeebled when it comes 
to expressing normative judgments about the results of such battles.   
 The second, more far-reaching reason for central support is that authorities, or 
elites, might see such a policy as a useful means of promoting group identity. Thus, the 
Chinese government based in Beijing supported and pressed Mandarin on the provinces, 
even though we might guess that local preferences were overwhelmingly inclined to 
maintain local dialects and not to bear the switching costs. Mandarin became mandatory 
for some things, and it was to be the language of the future if only because it was 
imposed on primary schools everywhere, but we can think of it as an “opt-in” choice for 
many enterprises. Note that most of economic theory conveniently assumes that 
preferences are given, and the usual paradigm leaves no room for something like 
“developing a national identity,” or otherwise investing in the development of new 
preferences. A central agency in control of arts funding might be expected to favor 
touring performers, works that draw on common historical experiences or myths, and 
other projects that promote a shared national identity. In the case of the European Union, 
elites may also favor projects and laws that promote a European identity, but they know 
to minimize coercion. Indeed, the centrally-planned commercial law now ascendant in 
																																																								
4 There are exceptions. Investment in durable goods, and even capital goods like schools, helps. 
Famously, the development of an industry with tax revenue implications, like the corporate law 
industry in Delaware, helps commit to a pattern of laws over the long term. 
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the EU is full of choice at the enterprise rather than jurisdictional level, and this may be 
the best tool of national unity that is politically acceptable.  
 The fact that one interest group promotes harmonization in furtherance of a shared 
identity does not mean that other groups cannot join in the project but have different 
motives. Large commercial enterprises might favor the harmonization of commercial law 
either because of the potential for reducing transaction costs in their far-flung transactions 
or because they perceive a competitive advantage over modestly sized firms that are 
comfortable with local laws. An interesting possibility is that risk averse businesses 
might prefer variety because different laws favor different business strategies or (even) 
products. Any one business will more likely find a market in which to flourish if there are 
different markets, and commercial law is part of what makes a market. Disparate 
businesses will thrive in in different environments, and variety in law makes for different 
environments. Just as a given business might like free trade, because it opens new 
markets even as it brings in competitors to the market it already inhabits, so it might like 
different environments, and thus non-harmonized laws, in these markets.  This may be a 
modest factor compared to the cost of switching (for some businesses) and the cost of 
interfacing and dealing with several legal systems (for others), but these latter factors are 
already appreciated as part of the case for and against harmonization. European Union 
bureaucrats will prefer harmonization for very different reasons, and not only the 
evolution of a shared identity, including the fact they are likely to be the source of 
mandatory and other rules.  But it bears repeating that wherever harmonization is found, 
it has the capacity to promote a shared identity. 
 
4. Sorting versus median voters 
 
The most significant cost harmonization is the sacrifice of the welfare gains obtained 
when mobile citizens sort themselves in a differentiated world. But sorting is not the only 
way to accommodate disparate preferences. When a decision is made in a constituent 
jurisdiction it will reflect the political process found there. If we simplify by setting 
authoritarian governments, powerful bureaucrats, interest groups, and even intense 
preferences aside, we can settle on the approximation, or ideal, that a jurisdiction’s 
political decisions reflect the preferences of its median voter. Thus, even if citizens are 
immobile, differentiation can be expected to improve welfare so long as there is some 
pressure for jurisdictions to respond to or reflect the preferences of its residents. Legal 
systems are in this way like firms in a market, and variety provides benefits. We should 
expect (even) similar jurisdictions to have disparate traffic laws, arts subsidies, criminal 
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laws, farm policies, school curricula, and environmental laws alongside their different 
cuisines and fashions. With respect to some of these topics, there are right answers, as 
opposed to mere preferences, and we might expect various processes to lead to 
convergence on those answers, or best practices. At the same time, many right answers 
depend at least in part on preferences. Any two populations are likely to have people with 
different preferences, and it is unlikely that two jurisdictions will have median voters 
with identical preferences on many issues. In all the areas just listed, there is only a 
modest inclination (or preference) for imposing preferences on other jurisdictions, and 
there is benefit in not having foreign preferences imposed on oneself. In one example 
(traffic laws) there are modest transaction costs to be saved through harmonization and in 
another (environmental law) there are externalities to be dealt with, but in none of these 
cases would the argument for harmonization be made as strongly as it is with respect to 
commercial law.  
When two jurisdictions harmonize their (traffic, environmental, or commercial) 
laws, it is likely that they compromise between the domestic compromises they have 
already made. We can conveniently imagine that the median voters in the two 
jurisdictions must meet and agree on a midpoint, or perhaps the “combined” jurisdiction 
reaches a result that reflects its median voter. As the number of jurisdictions increases, it 
is theoretically possible to imagine that the losers, which is to say those whose 
preferences are distant from the median voter’s, in many jurisdictions could locate one 
another and benefit from central decisionmaking by overcoming their respective median 
voters at that level.5 Without direct elections for the centralized authorities, however, this 
is most unlikely. 
 To be sure, laws are not only about preferences. Many questions of law have right 
answers or codify best practices, as opposed to median preferences–unless the correct 
characterization is simply that the median voter prefers the best practice. For example, 
the speed limit on comparable bridges might be identical in different jurisdictions. But 
most laws will reflect a mix of superior policies and preferences. Thus, there is no single 
best set of criminal penalties, because preferences come into play where questions of 
																																																								
5 In other words, each country in the EU can be thought of as a jurisdiction in which the median 
voter prevails. When these countries combine and make centralized decisions it is barely possible 
that the result is not a compromise among the 27 median voters, or a majority of those idealized 
positions, but rather an aggregation of the losers in many countries who find enough like-minded 
partners at the federation level. This is, of course, vastly more likely in a federation like the 
United States where these nonmedian voters can combine to elect a president, or even more so in 
a federation with frequent plebiscites. A federation dominated and managed by elected 
representatives of constituent states seems far more likely to reflect the median voters in some of 
those states.  
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experimentation, rehabilitation, and expenditures on improving prison conditions are 
concerned. To be sure, the median voter in a jurisdiction might also have a preference 
about the desirability of harmonization, and mixed into this preference calculation will be 
that voter’s own projections regarding transaction costs and experimentation, so we might 
expect some amount of harmonization, or simply convergence, rather than diversity, for 
this reason alone. It follows that if two jurisdictions have similar populations (in terms of 
preferences), their respective median voters might not be so far apart in terms of their 
inclinations. In turn, when transaction costs associated with trade, enforcement, and other 
matters are added in, preferences regarding the content of laws might indeed converge 
across these jurisdictions. Even if we could set simply imitation aside, we would expect 
the laws of two countries in Western Europe to be more similar than one drawn from a 
South America and the other from a democracy in Southeast Asia. 
 Prior to enriching the analysis with the concept of external costs, it may be useful 
to pause and placate the reader who is impatient with this circuitous approach to 
harmonization of (EU) commercial law, both because commercial law seems especially 
removed from mere preferences and because the CESL is structured as optional—
especially where business-to-business transactions are concerned, and even more so 
because the choice is at the enterprise rather than jurisdictional level. Even readers who 
are inclined to agree that a theoretical approach, situating one harmonization question 
within others, can be profitable, are likely to object that most of commercial law not only 
reflects right answers regarding transactional efficiency but also deals rather directly with 
trade among jurisdictions and, therefore, transaction costs more than preferences. The 
median voter surely wants these costs reduced, the argument goes, and has perhaps been 
thwarted by local interest groups, including lawyers who invested in learning local codes 
and who enjoy something of a monopoly if these disparate codes are retained. The 
benefits from harmonization–as well as the explanation for stasis–might be analogized to 
those at stake where the metric and imperial measurement systems are concerned. 
 There are a few responses to this objection. One is that commercial law, 
especially when mandatory, brings on more conflicts among interest groups, perhaps 
because some rules impose costs on those parties that do not expect to engage in much 
cross-jurisdiction trade. A better response is that commercial law is not unmoored from 
voters’ preferences. To begin with, there is the question of consumer protection, where 
protecting careless or unsophisticated shoppers comes at a cost to all, and thus implicates 
preferences regarding wealth distribution, paternalism, and the like. It is unsurprising that 
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this piece of European harmonization receives the most attention. 6  A second, less 
significant trigger of preferences is the inevitable suppression of local history, language, 
and culture implicated in all harmonization. A population that values tradition will gain 
utility from commercial (or any) law that can be traced back to the rules used by its 
forebears. 7  There is no reason to expect this taste to be similar across populations, 
especially because some nations prefer to distance themselves from their geographic or 
genetic ancestors, while others exalt them.  Finally, and most significantly, many 
elements of commercial law mix preferences with right answers. Priorities in bankruptcy, 
for example, might pit the claims of employees against those of the debtor’s tort victims, 
and various preferences and values will generate an inclination to favor one group over 
the other. Even the details of a secured transactions regime will bring into play relative 
tolerance for forcible repossessions and garnished wages, while others will reflect 
judgments about how much risk consumers should bear in return for lower prices.8  
  
5.   The calculus of consent and optimal legal areas 
 
The more we think of law as reflecting the preferences of the median voter, the more we 
need to ask why something is decided by law rather than left to markets (or families or 
other institutions) in the first place. In median voter terms, we can begin by noting the 
tyranny of the median voter, and then move to the question of why we cannot increase 
																																																								
6 There are principal-agent problems affecting voters and their representatives and also between 
legislators and “their” regulators. Consumer protection law is likely the area within commercial 
law where these are most significant, and thus the role of harmonization in advancing the cause of 
one or the other the greatest. Singer, “Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International 
Regulatory Harmonization”, (2004) International Organization 531-65, thinks of harmonization 
as a tool for satisfying domestic political pressures rather than the regulators own preferences. 
7  The role played by culture in creating friction (or noncompliance) for harmonization is 
discussed in Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, and Leiber, Complying with Europe: EU Harmonization 
and Soft Law in the Member States (Cambridge, 2005). 
8 Secured Transactions is a good topic with which to contemplate the pressure to harmonize even 
where the harmonized element begins in optional form. As firms elect the CESL for cross-border 
transactions, we can be sure that countries, not to mention the authorities in Brussels, will try to 
make the law mandatory. Even if this is not the case, as some firms elect the law because it is 
attractive to them, other firms will find that parties resist transacting unless they too agree to opt 
in to the CESL.  
 Consider by way of analogy the fact that credit cards have spread, though their use is 
optional at the enterprise level. Firms need not accept them, and consumers need not carry them, 
but as they become ubiquitous one is at a serious disadvantage without them. Universality does 
not prove desirability, and does not eliminate the costs imposed on the minority that was dragged 
in to the system. Another, more provocative, example is found in the evolution of smoking 
regulation, which has evolved from opt-in to mandates in many jurisdictions.  
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welfare by creating many more lucky median voters–by making jurisdictions smaller and 
smaller, much as markets segment to serve a variety of consumer tastes. In the extreme 
case, if each individual opts in to his own consumer law or commercial law, then 
everyone’s preferences can be satisfied. Note that a jurisdiction can be large for one 
purpose, such as national defense or currency, and much smaller for another, as is true in 
some places for public schools and traffic management, and could be true for commercial 
law. Indeed, the optimal jurisdiction size for one question of commercial law may well be 
different from that appropriate for another. The thought experiment reminds us that each 
jurisdiction has already harmonized, or unified, laws covering those who live within its 
borders (except where it has chosen not to issue mandatory regulations). There is no 
reason to think that it will maximize welfare by maximizing coercion through unification. 
The problem with too much individual choice, of course, is that scale brings advantages, 
most notably a reduction in various transaction costs. In area after area of law, individuals 
would trade away some autonomy in return for lower prices, coordination gains, and so 
forth. If we allow everyone to make his or her own laws, there will be substantial 
interaction costs, or simply much less trade. Among other things, this tradeoff pushes 
large swaths of law into one package when it comes to the size of the jurisdiction in 
which it will prevail. 
 As the title of this Article (and Part) suggests, the framework is also meant to 
remind us to incorporate Buchanan and Tullock’s notion that a majority can be expected 
to impose “external costs.”9 Inasmuch as I intend to contrast commercial law with other 
government actions, it is useful to dwell on the external costs problem, which is in some 
tension with the median voter perspective. The analysis is first framed in terms of 
individuals within a jurisdiction, but it is the same for numerous jurisdictions within a 
union; there is a median voter at both levels, and at both levels there is the problem or 
temptation of external-cost imposition. 
 Consider three different cases. In the first, a simple majority votes to build a new 
road at the expense of all taxpayers. Buchanan and Tullock develop the idea that the 
majority might make an inefficient choice as to where to locate the road or whether to 
construct it at all because 49% of the cost of the road is borne by the minority. The 
majority can build a road the minority would oppose, perhaps simply by locating it where 
it is useful to the majority alone. If the decisionmakers enjoy 100% of the benefits but 
pay only 51% of the costs, they are likely to overbuild. The smaller the share of costs 
paid by the majority, the greater the inefficiency problem. In the second case, the 
																																																								
9  Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 1962). 
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assumption about uniform taxation is relaxed, so that the majority can draft not only the 
road plan but also the tax law, so that it can burden the minority and not itself. The 
inefficiency problem is yet greater; the majority can gain all of the benefits and pay none 
of the costs.  If it can externalize costs in this manner, it will build roads it barely wants, 
though these are costly to others. It goes without saying that the example is 
oversimplified; among other things, it ignores the ability of the minority to turn this into a 
“mere” wealth transfer problem, by paying the majority not to build the road.  
 In a third version of the external cost problem, the majority is constrained and 
able to force expenditures by simple majority vote only with respect to pure public goods. 
Things like roads are paid for with user fees, or by taxes that are unanimously approved, 
or they are not built at all. Still, public goods are not identically valued by all participants, 
and the majority might order an inefficiently high level of a public good because the 
majority values it more than the minority, though not enough to pay for it by itself. The 
problem of external costs is solved only if majorities are unstable, so that a minority with 
respect to one spending program is in the majority in the next go around, and there is a 
possibility of open or subtle bargains so that all majorities refrain from imposing external 
costs. There is little evidence for such an optimistic resolution. 
 It is plausible that the external cost problem is greater in smaller jurisdictions than 
in larger ones. Two voters can impose external costs on one, and a small number of 
players is likely to be better at maintaining a stable majority, and exploiting the minority 
in repeat fashion, than is a large number. A smaller jurisdiction is also likely to have 
homogenous voters who will form a majority and be confident that they will have similar 
preferences across many issues. Workers living near a factory or farmers who grow the 
same crop in a suitable valley come to mind. On the other hand, in many cases it is easier 
for an exploited minority to exit from a smaller jurisdiction without severing employment 
and familial ties. 
 Fortunately, the external cost problem is largely limited to cases where 
expenditures are concerned, and does not extend to all law. A good deal of imagination 
and many assumptions are required before the most severe external cost problem can be 
brought about by government regulation rather than spending. By way of illustration, 
products liability law may be voted in by a majority and imposed on a minority, but the 
costs are spread across most purchasers and the presumed benefits will flow to some 
subset of these purchasers, and then some other parties as well. The match between 
burdens and benefits is imperfect, so there is room for the majority to externalize some 
costs, but the problem is modest compared to what is possible when a majority 
contemplates an excise tax to fund a new bridge. Other regulatory law is more suspect on 
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these grounds. For example, environmental regulations may benefit the majority, while it 
imposes cleanup costs on a completely different, minority, group. With such a mismatch, 
the majority, or even a well-organized interest group, might easily pass inefficient 
regulations.  
Readers will have disparate intuitions about where commercial law fits in this 
scheme, and that may depend on the level of coercion in an initial, harmonized code. 
Most of commercial law is surely more like products liability and less like environmental 
regulation; it is certainly not like bridge building with an excise tax on an unrelated good 
or activity. It is tempting to say that commercial law resembles none of these because 
much of it allows parties to contract out; in the case of the CESL the default is reversed 
and enterprises opt in rather than out. Where opting out is the rule, contracts may be 
costly, and for many parties and transactions the default position is all that matters. Even 
when there is no formal coercion, as others opt in one suffers costs by not doing so. In 
any event, there is reason to think if a code like the CESL has relevance, it will quickly 
take the opt-out form or even be imposed by the majority on certain transactions; it is 
hard to resist the benefits associated with imposing external costs and competitive 
disadvantages on others. If so, then it is worth pointing out that there are many areas of 
commercial law where courts are hostile to provisions, like liquidated damages, that 
attempt to contract out of default terms provided by law. In other areas, like credit 
transactions, it is difficult to contract out because of third-part effects. It is, for example, 
difficult to contract around payment systems or the priority rules of most secured 
transactions regimes. 
 Law may rarely be a pure public good, but it is difficult to exclude those who 
wish to make use of it. Its benefits cannot normally be restricted to 60% of the population 
while the other 40% pays for it. It could be structured as more of a private good. One can 
imagine charging litigants for the use of courts and collecting substantial user fees from 
debtors for such things as the law of secured transactions. The typical legal system, 
however, charges modest fees for these benefits and provides a publicly supported 
system, albeit one that produces precedents, trade, and other positive externalities. Thus, 
legal institutions, though they may arise out of a desire to impose preferences through 
harmonization, are likely to reflect the first type of majoritarian advantage, with its 
attendant external costs. The majority will impose more law than is efficient, and 
certainly more than it would pay for on its own, because it can share costs with those who 
will not benefit. The situation in which the external costs problem is greatest, as 
illustrated by the case where the majority can build roads it alone enjoys while it 
succeeds in taxing the minority to pay the entire cost, is very hard to reproduce where 
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lawmaking, rather than spending, is involved. The most important sorting, but also the 
greatest danger from sorting, is unlikely to apply where harmonization of enabling or 
regulatory law (as opposed to taxing and spending) is at issue. 
 This is hardly the place to generalize about optimal legal areas, for that is a matter 
complicated by the question of the gains and losses from harmonizing some things but 
not others. I have already noted that the optimal size is likely to be different with respect 
to every question, and this may be so even within commercial law. One might want a 
large jurisdiction for defense, a small one for consumer law, a bit larger for secured 
transactions, a different size still for road building, and so forth. But it is clear that these 
various optima make the question of effective political representation extremely difficult, 
and the relative power of interest groups even harder to assess. 
 
6. Conclusion: convergence and compacts 
 
The United States hardly needed harmonized commercial law to promote a sense of 
national identity, and yet its commercial law is fairly well harmonized, both where 
merchant-to-merchant transactions are concerned and, increasingly, where consumer law 
is at issue. There is no obvious evidence of significant cost externalization in this 
commercial law system. In the American experience we find another clue about 
harmonization; it came about largely through convergence. By convergence I mean, first, 
that different jurisdictions converged on the same legal rule, without any authority 
pushing them to do so.10 In the most interesting cases convergence evolves across legal 
systems, without borrowing and even without knowledge of the other legal system. In the 
United States there has been some coerced harmonization (because of federal law 
regulating some consumer law, securities law, and so forth) but also convergence by state 
legislatures and courts, though hardly without awareness of other jurisdictions. Most 
significantly, model codes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, have been drafted, 
and states have been free to adopt these codes, often with minor local adjustments. A 
clever political or psychological aspect to these opt-in codes, is that states do not feel as if 
another state was triumphant.11 The “winner” is a code usually drafted by nonpolitical 
actors, influenced greatly by organized interest groups but normally incorporating a 
drafting committee eager to draft the best possible law. These interests keep an eye on the 
politics of adoption by state legislatures but it would be a mistake to minimize their 
																																																								
10 Levmore, “Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser”, 16 Journal 
of Legal Studies, (1987), 43-65.  
11 In other words, everyone bears switching costs. See Carbonara & Parisi, op. cit. supra note 4.  
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desire to find the best answers. Second, there is convergence at the enterprise level. For 
example, one insurance company develops a form, and then because its terms are 
litigated, it becomes advantageous for other firms to use the same form, and it eventually 
becomes standard. One landlord or printing company draws a lease, and then others copy 
it, perhaps because drafting one’s own lease signals potential bargaining partners that one 
is strategic. Convergence as to terms also makes price comparisons more straightforward. 
Convergence thus occurs even, or especially, where—as in the world of the CESL—
harmonization is completely optional. 
 A good argument for EU harmonization with respect to commercial law is that 
harmonization in the United States, and certainly in China, is further along than in the 
EU, and apparently successful (though it is difficult to evaluate the counterfactuals). 
There is no evidence that states try to diverge or to separate from harmonized commercial 
law. Smaller units do try to serve as experimental zones, and Hong Kong might be 
thought of as an example of diversity rather than harmonization, but inasmuch as most 
observers would say that it represents a step toward a harmonized result, I will not dwell 
on that exception. In any event, harmonization in the United States came not from central 
directives but from convergence. Nothing has stopped the members of the EU from 
converging on one law. It might be said that in many cases members of the United States 
converge with respect to commercial law and many other kinds of law because they know 
that if they do not, there is a good chance that federal law will develop and will preempt 
state law, with no room for dissent or even minor variations. Convergence and soft 
harmonization is thus often in the shadow of the threat of strong harmonization–though 
there is no evidence for this in the case of business-to-business commercial law. 
Whatever the extent of this effect, it seems impossible to say whether welfare is 
maximized under current U.S. law.  Local variation may reflect local preferences and 
may increase welfare, or it may reflect overachieving interest groups and may be 
unfortunate in its imposition of transaction costs. Nor is there much to learn from the 
relationship between local variation and national identity in the United States. 
 Imagine that fifteen of twenty-seven jurisdictions in a federation are relatively 
homogeneous in the sense that the majority coalition in each of these jurisdictions sees 
that its preferences are sufficiently similar to those of the majority coalition (or median 
voter) in the other fourteen jurisdictions that it would prefer to abide by the laws of its 
like-minded partners than it would to the (unknown) decisions of the future majority of 
the twenty-seven.  Alternatively, some members of the fifteen have intense preferences 
about some matters, and the group of fifteen is like-minded on these matters. The case is 
ripe for the imposition of external costs. Imagine further that there are restrictions on 
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expenditures or taxes, perhaps because members of the federation sought to protect 
themselves from the external costs problem. The subset of fifteen can, therefore, 
maneuver only with regulatory law. In such cases, the fifteen would be better off agreeing 
to agree in the future.12 This power of a precommitted caucus, or subgroup, is familiar to 
students of political parties. In the American constitutional system it is combatted by a 
rule requiring congressional approval of state compacts; several states cannot simply 
form a binding alliance. But it is clear that if a coalition of members, or elected 
representatives, could oblige themselves to vote alike in the future they would gain at the 
benefit of their disorganized allies. The reasoning behind this counterintuitive claim 
begins with the assumption or requirement that each voter (each jurisdiction in the 
compacting group, or each senator in the set of senators contemplating such a pact) 
expects more often than not to agree with the majority of the group. We began, after all, 
with the assumption that a subset had similar preferences. If so, it is beneficial to agree to 
vote with the majority of one’s subgroup on all matters, as the agreement leverages one’s 
own vote a majority of the time. A second step, or corollary, is that the compacting group 
will then prefer for more matters to be decided centrally rather than be left to local 
preferences and votes, because each member of the compacting group has more power 
than the nonmembers where central decisionmaking is concerned. The analogy for a 
federation, or for the EU in particular, is that a like-minded subset will prefer for more 
things to be decided by directive, or in some other centralized manner. Federations have a 
way of combatting this compacting, or subgroup, problem. They can hope to enforce a 
plain ban on subgroup precommitments to vote together in the future. Alternatively, they 
can require various matters to be decided by supermajority.  
 Note, however, that the federation should not be expected to combat the power of 
the organized subgroup by opposing harmonization. Harmonization can be expected to 
increase the influence of the central bureaucracy, though the details of harmonization are 
likely to reflect the preferences of the overachieving, organized subgroup.  
 It seems plain that a self-identified minority, not empowered by “membership” in 
a like-minded subgroup, should generally resist harmonization. In the context of the 
European Union this means that a jurisdiction that thinks it is more likely to be exploited 
than it is to exploit others should oppose harmonization with respect to something like 
commercial law. Nothing stops it from allowing its laws to converge on the majority’s, 
much as its citizens might over time dress in the fashions prevalent in other countries, 
without committing to do so through any law. Fashions at home and abroad can change, 
																																																								
12 See Levmore, “Precommitment politics”, 82 Virginia Law Review (1996), 567. 
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and it would seem strange to agree in advance to abide by conventions set by others in 
return for very modest gains in trade. 
 In contrast, jurisdictions (like individual voters or representatives) that see 
themselves as part of a stable, continuing majority with similar preference should 
normally prefer more central decisionmaking, including harmonization.13 There is the 
danger that the ability to externalize costs will generate inefficient laws, as might the 
advantage of a kind of compact that dominates disorganized states, but that is of no 
concern to the majority. If the primary consequence of harmonization, whether intended 
or not, is the development of a single political and cultural identity, then there is the 
question of whose identity and values will dominate, and the most likely result is that 
harmonization will favor the stable majority. Perhaps those who most favor strong 
harmonization in the case of EU commercial law are those who expect to win this culture 





























13 Multinational firms may benefit from harmonization because it reduces transactions costs, but I 
hazard no conjecture on the question of political influence. Some large firms might do better 
dividing and conquering at the local level, while others might be perceived as gaining power 
when the they need only influence central decisionmaking.  
 18
Chicago	Working	Papers	in	Law	and	Economics	
(Second Series) 
 
For	a	listing	of	papers	1–550	please	go	to	Working	Papers	at	http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html	
	
551.	 Douglas	G.	Baird,	Car	Trouble,	May	2011		
552.	 Omri	Ben‐Shahar,	Fixing	Unfair	Contracts,	May	2011	
553.	 Saul	Levmore	and	Ariel	Porat,	Bargaining	with	Double	Jeopardy,	May	2011	
554.	 Adam	B.	Cox	and	Richard	T.	Holden,	Reconsidering	Racial	and	Partisan	Gerrymandering,	May	
2011	
555.	 David	S.	Evans,	The	Antitrust	Economics	of	Free,	May	2011	
556.	 Lee	Anne	Fennell,	Property	and	Precaution,	June	2011	
557.	 Omri	Ben‐Shahar	and	Anu	Bradford,	Reversible	Rewards,	June	2011,	revised	November	
2011	
558.	 Alon	Harel	and	Ariel	Porat,	Commensurability	and	Agency:	Two	Yet‐to‐Be‐Met	Challenges	for	
Law	and	Economics,	June	2011	
559.	 Randal	C.	Picker,	After	Google	Book	Search:	Rebooting	the	Digital	Library,	June	2011	
560.	 Julie	A.	Roin,	Privatization	and	the	Sale	of	Tax	Revenues,	July	2011	
561.	 Joseph	Issenbergh,	Last	Chance,	America,	July	2011	
562.	 Richard	H.	McAdams,	Present	Bias	and	Criminal	Law,	July	2011	
563.	 David	Weisbach,	Is	Knowledge	of	the	Tax	Law	Socially	Desirable?,	July	2011	
564.	 Louis	Kaplow	and	David	Weisbach,	Discount	Rates,	Judgments,	Individuals’	Risk	Preferences,	
and	Uncertainty,	July	2011	
565.	 Louis	Kaplow,	Elisabeth	Moyer	and	David	A.	Weisbach,	The	Social	Evaluation	of	
Intergenerational	Policies	and	Its	Application	to	Integrated	Assessment	Models	of	Climate	
Change,	July	2011	
566.	 David	A.	Weisbach,	Carbon	Taxation	in	Europe:	Expanding	the	EU	Carbon	Price,	July	2011	
567.	 Nuno	Garoupa	and	Tom	Ginsburg,	Hybrid	Judicial	Career	Structures:	Reputation	v.	Legal	
Tradition,	August	2011	
568.	 Richard	A.	Epstein,	F.	Scott	Kieff,	and	Daniel	F.	Spulber,	The	FTC’s	Proposal	for	Regulationg	
IP	through	SSOs	Would	Replace	Private	Coordination	with	Government	Holdups,	August	
2011	
569.	 Dhammika	Dharmapala,	Nuno	Garoupa,	and	Richard	McAdams,	Do	Exclusionary	Rules	
Convict	the	Innocent?		August,	2011	
570.	 Andres	Sawicki,	Better	Mistakes	in	Patent	Law,	August	2011	
571.	 Jonathan	S.	Masur	and	Eric	A.	Posner,	Regulation,	Unemployment,	and	Cost‐Benefit	Analysis,	
August	2011	
572.	 Adam	B.	Cox	and	Eric	A.	Posner,	Delegation	in	Immigration	Law,	September	2011	
573.	 Joseph	Bankman	and	David	Weisbach,	A	Critical	Look	at	a	Critical	Look—Reply	to	Sanchirico,	
September	2011	
574.	 M.	Todd	Henderson	and	Frederick	Tung,	Pay	for	Regulator	Performance,	September	2011	
575.	 William	H.	J.	Hubbard,	The	Problem	of	Measuring	Legal	Change,	with	Application	to	Bell	
Atlantic	v.	Twombly,	September	2011	
576.	 Adam	M.	Samaha,	Regulation	for	the	Sake	of	Appearance,	October	2011	
577.	 Ward	Farnsworth,	Dustin	Guzior,	and	Anup	Malani,	Implicit	Bias	in	Legal	Interpretation,	
October	2011	
578.	 Anup	Malani	and	Julian	Reif,	Accounting	for	Anticipation	Effects:	An	Application	to	Medical	
Malpractice	Tort	Reform,	October	2011	
579.	 Scott	A.	Baker	and	Anup	Malani,	Does	Accuracy	Improve	the	Information	Value	of	Trials?	
October	2011	
580.	 Anup	Malani,	Oliver	Bembom	and	Mark	van	der	Laan,	Improving	the	FDA	Approval	Process,	
October	2011	
581.	 Brian	Leiter,	The	Boundaries	of	the	Moral	(and	Legal)	Community,	October	2011	
582.	 David	S.	Evans,	Governing	Bad	Behavior	by	Users	of	Multi‐Sided	Platforms,	October	2011	
 19
583.	 Stephen	J.	Choi,	Mitu	Gulati	and	Eric	A.	Posner,	Political	Risk	and	Sovereign	Debt	Contracts,	
November	2011	
584.	 Lee	Fennell,	Ostrom’s	Law:	Property	Rights	in	the	Commons,	November	2011	
585.	 Lee	Fennell,	Lumpy	Property,	January	2012	
586.	 David	A.	Weisbach,	Should	Environmental	Taxes	Be	Precautionary?		January	2012	
587.	 Ariel	Porat	and	Eric	A.	Posner,	Aggregation	and	Law,	January	2012	
588.	 Oren	Bar‐Gill	and	Ariel	Porat,	Beneficial	Victims,	February	2012	
589.	 Eric	A.	Posner	and	E.	Glen	Weyl,	An	FDA	for	Financial	Innovation:	Applying	the	Insurable	
Interest	Doctrine	to	Twenty‐First‐Century	Financial	Markets,	February	2012	
590.	 Bernard	E.	Harcourt,	On	the	American	Paradox	of	Laissez	Faire	and	Mass	Incarceration,	
March	2012	
591.	 Bernard	E.	Harcourt,	Fantasies	and	Illusions:	On	Liberty,	Order	and	Free	Markets,	March	
2012	
592.	 Saul	Levmore	and	Ariel	Porat,	Asymmetries	and	Incentives	in	Evidence	Production,	March	
2012	
593.	 Omri	Ben‐Shahar	and	Kyle	D.	Logue,	Outsourcing	Regulation:	How	Insurance	Reduces	Moral	
Hazard,	April	2012	
594.	 Eric	A.	Posner	and	E.	Glen	Weyl,	A	Proposal	for	Limiting	Speculation	on	Derivatives:	An	FDA	
for	Financial	Innovation,	March	2012	
595.	 Lee	Anne	Fennell,	Picturing	Takings,	April	2012	
596.	 David	Fagundes	and	Jonathan	S.	Masur,	Costly	Intellectual	Property,	April	2012	
597.	 Eric	A.	Posner,	The	Questionable	Basis	of	the	Common	European	Sales	Law:	The	Role	of	an	
Optional	Instrument	in	Jurisdictional	Competition,	May	2012	
598.	 Oren	Bar‐Gill	and	Omri	Ben‐Shahar,	Regulatory	Techniques	in	Consumer	Protection:	A	
Critique	of	European	Consumer	Contact	Law,	May	2012	
599.	 Bernard	E.	Harcourt,	Punitive	Preventive	Justice:	A	Critique,	May	2012	
600.	 Joshua	Elliott,	Ian	Foster,	Sam	Kortum,	Gita	Khun	Jush,	Todd	Munson,	and	David	Weisbach,	
Unilateral	Carbon	Taxes,	Border	Tax	Adjustments,	and	Carbon	Leakage,	June	2012	
601.	 David	A.	Weisbach,	Should	Environmental	Taxes	Be	Precautionary?	June	2012	
602.	 Saul	Levmore,	Harmonization,	Preferences,	and	the	Calculus	of	Consent	in	Commercial	and	
Other	Law,	June	2012	
 
